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On March 27th India successfully tested an anti-satellite (ASAT) missile against
one of its own test satellites, creating a cloud of space debris which might collide
with the International Space Station (read our post of last week here). Since ASAT
weapons are ultimately designed to be used against satellites of other states,
scenarios in which space debris is caused through international hostilities become
more realistic. As the conflict in the Indo-Pakistani Kashmir region recently reignited
with new military force, a scenario in which India targets a Pakistani satellite is no
longer a matter of pure fiction. This Bofax is part one of a two-part series dealing
with selected issues revolving around the use of ASAT missiles against satellites
of other states. The first Bofax assesses if the prohibition on the use of force could
be violated in such scenarios. The second Bofax will reflect on the protection of
outer space as part of the environment under outer space law and international
humanitarian law (IHL).
Given the rising risk of ASAT missiles targeting satellites of other states, it should
be clarified if the prohibition on the use of force applies in that context. Until now
it has mostly been discussed how international law deals with force from space
against earth-based targets. The question of how to assess force directed against
objects in space is rarely considered (read more here). Article 2(4) UNCH which
codifies customary international law and is generally considered to constitute ius
cogens states that “all Members shall refrain in their international relations from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations“. The prohibition was included in the UNCH to protect the sovereignty of
states, which is often considered to be limited to the state’s own territory. Today a
more modern understanding of the prohibition on the use of force going beyond state
territory is derived from the last part of Article 2(4) UNCH, which focusses on the
question whether or not a use of force can be reconciled with the “Purposes of the
United Nations”. These are defined in i.a. Article 1(1) UNCH as the maintenance of
international peace and security as well as prevention and removal of any threats
to this peace. Attacks against objects of another state are threats to international
peace and thus attacks against another state’s satellites in a forceful manner would
fall within the scope of prohibited force under the UNCH.
The fact that the notion of prohibited force limited to a state’s territory does not fully
reflect a modern understanding of the term is also evident in the handling of the
prohibition regarding ships. Although ships are not state territory, attacks against
them in international waters can still constitute a violation of state sovereignty, as
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international law subjects ships to the sovereignty of the flag state. Applying this
fiction to satellites would thus require a nexus similar to the one between ships and
their flag state. This nexus could arguably be provided by the registration of space
objects by the launching state, as called for by Article II (1) of the Convention on
Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (Registration Agreement). The
launching state is defined in Article I a) as the state which launches or procures
the launching of a space object or the state from whose territory or facility a space
object is launched. While it could be argued that ships are only subjected to state
sovereignty due to a state’s jurisdiction over the crew, unmanned objects such as
drones are also considered suitable targets for unlawful force in order to protect state
sovereignty and to guarantee the right of self-defence (read more here). The same
interests exist with regard to satellites.
Further, Article III of the Outer Space Treaty requires states parties to use outer
space in accordance with the UNCH in the interest of maintaining international
peace and security. This corresponds to the United Nations purposes as reflected in
Article 2(4) UNCH. In conclusion, the use of ASAT missiles against satellites of other
states can violate the prohibition on the use of force.
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